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Their Liberties, Our Security

Democracy and Double Standards

DAVID COLE*

To those who pit Americans against immigrants and citizens against
non-citizens, to those who scarepeace-lovingpeople with phantoms
of lost liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists,for
they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give
ammunition to America's enemies, andpause to America's friends.
-Attorney General John Ashcroft, 6 December 2001

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 24, 2002, the United States military transported John
Walker Lindh, a young American raised in Marin County, California, and
captured with the Taliban on the battlefields of Afghanistan, to Alexandria,
Virginia, where he was to be indicted in a civilian criminal court for conspiring
to kill Americans. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer announced that "the
great strength of America is he will now have his day in court." Represented
by some of the best criminal defense attorneys in the country, Lindh raised
substantial constitutional challenges to his prosecution, and the government
ultimately dropped its most serious charges against him in exchange for a plea
agreement.

*Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This article was originally
published in the December 2002/January 2003 issue of Boston Review and is adapted
from "Enemy Aliens," 54 Stanford Law Review 953 (2002) which is available at
www. law.stanfordedu/lawreview/content/vol54/Cole.pdf Readers interested in citations
to authority should refer to that article. ©David Cole 2003.

2003]

DAVID COLE

At the same time, the military was holding 158 foreign-born Taliban
and al Qaeda prisoners at a military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in eightfoot-by-eight-foot chain-link cages. A widely circulated press photo depicted
the prisoners bound and shackled, with bags covering their heads and eyes,
kneeling on the ground before U.S. soldiers. They were (and still are) held
incommunicado, without charges, without access to lawyers, and without any
judicial review. President George W. Bush announced that he categorically
determined that the Guantanamo detainees were not entitled to the protections
accorded prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions, and Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld dismissed concerns about their treatment with the
assertion that they were "being treated vastly better than they treated anybody
else over the last several years." Two months earlier, the president had issued
a military order providing that al Qaeda members and other noncitizens could
be tried by military tribunals, in which the military would act as prosecutor,
judge, jury, and executioner, without any appeal to a civilian court.
The difference between the treatment afforded John Walker Lindh and
his fellow Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners held at Guantanamo appeared to rest
on the fact that Lindh was, as the press nicknamed him, "the American
Taliban." When Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the charges against
Lindh, a reporter asked why Lindh was being tried in an ordinary criminal
court rather than before a military tribunal. Ashcroft explained that because
Lindh was a United States citizen, he was not subject to the military tribunals
created by President Bush's order. As a purely legal matter, the president
could have made U.S. citizens subject to military commissions; citizens have
been tried in military tribunals before, and the Supreme Court expressly upheld
such treatment as recently as World War II. But the president chose to limit
his order to noncitizens. Several months later, however, military justice was
extended to U.S. citizens, as the government asserted the right to hold two
citizens-Yaser Hamdi, captured in Afghanistan, and Josd Padilla, arrested at
O'Hare Airport in May on suspicion that he might be planning to set off a
radioactive "dirty bomb"-as "enemy combatants," without charges, without
counsel, without trial, and without judicial review.
Both the president's initial choice to limit military justice to foreign
nationals and his subsequent extension of that authority to U.S. citizens are
emblematic of how we have responded to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. While there has been much talk about the need to sacrifice liberty for
a greater sense of security, in practice we have at least initially selectively
sacrificed noncitizens' liberties while retaining basic protections for citizens.
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All too often, we have sought to avoid the difficult trade-offs between liberty
and security by striking an illegitimate balance, sacrificing the liberties of
noncitizens in furtherance of the citizenry's purported security. Because
noncitizens have no vote, and thus no direct voice in the democratic process,
they are an especially vulnerable minority. And in the heat of the nationalistic
and nativist fervor engendered by .war, noncitizens' interests are even less
likely to weigh in the balance.
Some maintain that a "double standard" for citizens and noncitizens is
perfectly justified. The attacks of September 11 were perpetrated by nineteen
Arab noncitizens, and we have reason to believe that other Arab noncitizens
are associated with the attackers and will seek to attack again. Citizens, it is
said, are presumptively loyal; noncitizens are not. Thus, it is not irrational to
focus on Arab noncitizens. Moreover, on a normative level, if citizens and
noncitizens were treated identically, citizenship itself might be rendered
meaningless. The very essence of war involves the drawing of lines in the
sand between citizens of our nation and those against whom we are fighting.
Surely in that setting it makes sense to treat noncitizens differently from
citizens.
I will argue that such reasoning should be resisted on three grounds.
First, it is normatively and constitutionally wrong: the basic rights at
stake-political freedom, due process, and equal protection of the laws-are not
limited to citizens, but apply to all "persons" subject to our laws. Second, it
undermines our security interests: employing a double standard with respect to
the basic rights accorded citizens and noncitizens is likely to be
counterproductive at home and abroad because it compromises our legitimacy
in both spheres. And third, it will pave the way for future inroads on citizens'
liberties: as the government's treatment of Padilla and Hamdi has already
illustrated, the tactic of trading immigrants' rights for citizens' security is
misleading, for what we let our government do to immigrants creates
precedents for how it treats citizens.
In short, when we balance liberty and security, we should do so in
ways that respect the equal dignity and basic human rights of all persons and
not succumb to the temptation of purchasing security at the expense of
noncitizens' basic rights. The true test of justice in a democratic society is not
how it treats those with a political voice, but how it treats those who have no
voice in the democratic process.

DAVID COLE
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II. SACRIFICING THEIR LIBERTY FOR OUR SECURITY: THE POST-9/11
RESPONSE

"[S]omebody who comes into the United States of America illegally,
who conducts a terrorist operation killing thousands of innocent
Americans-men, women, and children-is not a lawful combatant.... They
don't deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an
American citizen going through the normal judicial process." With these words
Vice President Dick Cheney defended the president's military order of
November 13, 2001, which authorized trial by military commission of any
noncitizen whom the president accuses of engaging in international terrorism
or belonging to al Qaeda. The vice president's view captures much of the
administration's response to the attacks of September 11. Each of its initiatives
raises serious constitutional concerns, and each imposes burdens on
noncitizens' basic rights-burdens that citizens do not bear.

Secret Preventive Detention
Perhaps the most troubling feature of the government's response to the
September 11 attacks has been its campaign of mass preventive detention. The
actual number detained is a mystery because in early November 2001, when
the number was 1,147, the government responded to growing criticism of the
number of persons it was detaining by halting its practice of issuing a running
tally. Even if one assumes that arrests dropped substantially after the first
seven weeks of the investigation, it is likely that somewhere between 1500 and
2000 persons have been detained in the more than twelve months that the
investigation has continued. Yet not a single one of the post-9/11 detainees
has been charged with involvement in the crimes under investigation. As of
September 2002, only Zaccarias Moussaoui had been so charged, and he was
arrested before the roundup began. Attorney General John Aschcroft has
described the detainees as "suspected terrorists," yet by the one-year
anniversary of the investigation, only four detained individuals had been
charged with any terrorist-related crimes. Most of the detainees have been
released or deported, after being affirmatively cleared of any involvement in
terrorism by the FBI.

secrecy.

The detentions have been carried out under an unprecedented veil of
The government has refused to release any details regarding the
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identity of the detainees. And the vast majority of the detainees, those held on
immigration charges, have been tried in proceedings closed to the public, the
press, legal observers, and even family members. On orders from John
Ashcroft, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy has instructed immigration
judges not to list the cases on the public docket and, if asked, to refuse to
confirm or deny that they even exist. All hearings must be closed, no matter
how routine and whether or not any sensitive issues are discussed. If another
country were to lock up and try hundreds of people in secret, we would not
hesitate to call the detainees "disappeared." Six of the eight federal judges who
reviewed the government's practice of closing the immigration proceedings
have ruled the practice unconstitutional, and another federal judge has ruled
that the government violated the Freedom of Information Act in refusing to
disclose the detainees' names. Yet the secrecy continues as the government
appeals.
Many of those detained on immigration charges were initially held for
weeks, and in some cases months, without any charges at all. More than 317
detainees were held for more than 48 hours before being charged, 36 detainees
were held for more than four weeks without charges, and nine were held for
more than fifty days without charges. Once charges are filed, they are
generally "pretextual." The real reason for their incarceration is not that they
worked without authorization or took too few academic credits, for example,
both common violations of visas. Rather, the government has used these
excuses to detain them because it thinks they might have valuable information,
because it suspects them but lacks -sufficient evidence to make a charge, or
simply because the FBI is not yet convinced that they are innocent.
Consider, for example, Ali Maqtari. A Yemeni citizen, Maqtari was
picked up on September 15 when he accompanied his U.S.-citizen wife to Fort
Campbell, Kentucky, where she was reporting for Army basic training.
Agents interrogated him for more than twelve hours and accused him of being
involved with terrorists. Maqtari took and passed a lie detector test, but he
was detained on the highly technical charge that he had been in the country
illegally for ten days while changing his status from tourist to permanent
resident. The government never offered any evidence linking him to terrorism
or crime of any kind. It merely submitted a boilerplate affidavit from an FBI
agent arguing that Maqtari should be detained because the investigation of
terrorism is a "mosaic," and therefore, seemingly innocent facts might at some
future time turn out to indicate culpability. Two months later, Maqtari was
released without charges.

2003]

DAVID COLE

Ibrahim Turkmen, a citizen of Turkey, was arrested and detained on
October 13, 2001. About two weeks later an immigration judge granted
Turkmen voluntary departure, which meant he was legally free to leave the
country. Two days later, a friend purchased a plane ticket for him and brought
it to the INS office. Yet the INS kept Turkmen in custody for nearly four more
months, not because it had probable cause that he had committed any crimes,
but simply because the FBI had not yet convinced itself that he was innocent.
The Constitution does not permit detention for investigative purposes.
And immigration authorities have no freestanding authority to detain; they may
do so only when necessary to effectuate a noncitizen's removal from the
country. When a foreign citizen agrees to leave, there is no legitimate
immigration purpose to keep him detained. Yet many noncitizens have
remained in custody for months while the FBI investigates them and are
allowed to leave only after the FBI clears them.
These and other cases suggest that Justice Department policy has been
to lock up first, ask questions later, and presume that an alien is dangerous
until the FBI has a chance to assure itself that the individual is not. The
government has justified its actions with a liberal combination of the "mosaic"
argument noted above and the "sleeper" theory. Under the latter, the fact that
a suspicious person has done nothing illegal only underscores his
dangerousness; al Qaeda is said to have "sleeper" cells around the world,
groups of individuals living quiet and law-abiding lives but ready and willing
to commit terrorist attacks once they get the call.
Most immigration judges apparently accepted that the absence of
evidence of illegal conduct is not a reason to release a suspicious person. But
when some judges declined to go along with the detentions and ordered that
aliens be released on bond pending resolution of their deportation proceedings,
Attorney General Ashcroft changed the rules. Under a new regulation issued
October 29, 2001, even if an immigration judge rules after a custody hearing
that the government has shown no basis for detention, an INS district
director-in effect, the prosecutor-can keep the alien locked up simply by
filing an appeal of the release order. A federal judge has also declared this
rule unconstitutional.
If the New York police chief had investigated a serious violent crime
by arresting hundreds of residents virtually all of one ethnicity, held and tried
most of them in secret on pretextual charges, and failed after a year to charge
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even one of them with the crime under investigation, he would be out of a job.
Yet complaints about the 9/11 detainees have been muted. I believe the fact
that virtually all of them are foreign citizens has allowed the citizenry a sense
of comfort; these tactics will not apply to them. Citizens, after all, are entitled
to a public trial. They may be subjected to "preventive detention" in
connection with pending criminal charges, but only if brought before an
independent judge within 48 hours of arrest for a hearing to determine whether
there is probable cause that they have committed a crime, and only if they are
also shown in a fair adversarial proceeding to be a flight risk or danger to the
community. They are entitled to a "speedy trial," which means that unless they
agree to an extension, preventive detention will be limited to a matter of
weeks. In other words, we have imposed on foreign citizens widespread
human rights deprivations that we would not tolerate if imposed on ourselves.
The USA PatriotAct
The targeting of noncitizens is further reflected in the USA PatriotAct,
an omnibus antiterrorism bill enacted just six weeks after September 11. The
act makes many changes to criminal, immigration, banking, and intelligence
law, but it reserves its most extreme measures for noncitizens. For example,
it makes noncitizens deportable for wholly innocent associational activity.
Before September 11, aliens were deportable for engaging in or supporting
terrorist activity, but not for mere association. Aliens could be deported for
providing material support to an organization only if they knew or should
reasonably have known that their activity would support the organization "in
conducting a terrorist activity." The PatriotAct eliminates that requirement.
It makes aliens deportable for wholly innocent associational support of a
"terrorist organization," whether or not there is any connection between the
alien's conduct and any act of violence, much less terrorism.
Under this law, for example, a pacifist immigrant who sent a book by
Gandhi to the leader of a designated terrorist group to encourage him to forego
violence would be deportable as a terrorist, and would have no defense that his
intentions were honorable.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that individuals cannot be
penalized for their political associations absent proof that the individual
specifically intended to further a group's illegal ends, and that donations to a
political group are a form of protected association. Some argue, however, that
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the threat from terrorist organizations abroad and the fungibility of money
require adjustments to the constitutional prohibition on guilt by association.
But that prohibition was forged in the crucible of a battle against a foe that
seemed even more formidable at the time-the Communist Party. Congress
deemed the Communist Party a foreign-dominated organization, backed by the
world's competing superpower, which used sabotage and terrorism for the
purpose of overthrowing the United States by force and violence; the Supreme
Court accepted that finding. If association with such an organization deserves
constitutional protection, as the Supreme Court repeatedly has ruled, surely
association with much less powerful groups that have merely used or
threatened to use a weapon at some point deserves similar protection.
The fungibility argument also proves too much, for it would authorize
guilt by association whenever any organization engages in some illegal activity.
Donations to the Democratic Party, it could be argued, "free up" resources that
are used to violate campaign finance laws, yet surely we could not criminalize
all support to the Democratic Party simply because it sometimes violates
campaign finance laws. And the fungibility argument assumes that every
marginal dollar provided to a designated group will be spent on violence, but
in many cases that assumption is not warranted. No one would seriously
contend, for example, that every dollar given to the African National Congress
in the 1980s for its lawful anti-apartheid work in South Africa freed up a dollar
that the ANC devoted to terrorist attacks.
The PatriotAct also resurrects ideological exclusion, the practice of
denying entry to aliens purely on the basis of speech. It bars admission to
aliens who "endorse or espouse terrorist activity," who "persuade others to
support terrorist activity or a terrorist organization," or who are representatives
of groups that express such views. Because of the breadth of the definitions of
"terrorist activity" (virtually any act or threat of violence) and "terrorist
organizations" (any group of two or more persons that engages in or threatens
violence), this authority would empower the government to deny entry to any
alien who advocated support for the ANC in the 1980s, for the Contras during
the war against the Sandinistas, or for opposition forces in Afghanistan or even
the government of Israel today.
Excluding people for their ideas is contrary to the spirit of political
freedom for which the United States stands. It was for that reason that
Congress removed all such grounds from the immigration laws in 1990, after
years of embarrassing visa denials for political reasons. Yet we have now
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returned to the much-criticized ways of the McCarran-WalterAct, targeting
aliens not for their acts but for their words-words that would be fully
protected if uttered by United States citizens.
The PatriotAct also radically expands the government's authority to
detain immigrants. It gives the attorney general unprecedented power to detain
aliens indefinitely without a hearing and without showing that they pose a
threat to national security or a flight risk. He need only certify that he has
"reasonable grounds to believe" that the alien is "described in" various
anti-terrorism provisions of the INA, provisions so broad that they would
encompass a permanent resident alien who brandished a kitchen knife in a
domestic dispute with her abusive husband or an alien who donated a box of
crayons to a charitable day-care center associated with a "terrorist
organization."
The PatriotAct also appears to permit detention of aliens indefinitely,
even where they have prevailed in their removal proceedings. It provides that
detention shall be maintained "irrespective of . . . any relief from removal
granted the alien, until the attorney general determines that the alien is no
longer an alien who may be certified." Holding such a person in custody is
akin to holding a convicted prisoner after he has been pardoned.

Ethnic Profiling
One of the most dramatic responses to the attack of September 11 was
a swift reversal in public attitudes about racial and ethnic profiling as a law
enforcement tool. Before September 11, polls found that about 80 percent of
the American public considered racial profiling wrong. State legislatures, local
police departments, and President Clinton had condemned the practice and
ordered data collection on the racial patterns of stops and searches. The U.S.
Customs Service, sued for racial profiling, had instituted measures to counter
racial and ethnic profiling at the borders. A federal law prohibiting racial
profiling seemed likely. Even Ashcroft had criticized the practice and pledged
to end it.
After September 11, however, polls reported that nearly 60 percent of
the American public favored ethnic profiling directed at Arabs and Muslims.
The fact that the perpetrators of the September 11 attack were all male Arab
and Muslim immigrants and that the attack was orchestrated by al Qaeda has
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led many to believe that it is only common sense to pay closer attention to
Arab-looking men boarding airplanes and elsewhere. The high stakes make the
case for profiling stronger here than in routine drug interdiction stops on
highways. Stuart Taylor, a columnist for Newsweek, the National Journal, and
Legal Times, and a prior critic of racial profiling, wrote shortly after the
attacks in favor of ethnic profiling of Arab men on airplanes. Press accounts
made clear that, whether as a matter of official policy or not, law enforcement
officials and airline employees were paying much closer attention to those who
appear to be Arabs and Muslims.
While the Bush Administration has spoken out against ethnic and
religious stereotyping and hate crimes, its actions have sent a different
message. It called in eight thousand young men for interviews in connection
with the September 11 investigation, based not on their actual ties or conduct
but solely on the fact that they were young immigrant men from specified
countries. The countries singled out were said to be those where support for
al Qaeda was believed to exist: that is, Arab nations. In January 2002, the
Justice Department decided to prioritize the deportation of aliens from Arab
countries, again, simply because of their origin. And in August 2002, the INS
announced that it would require aliens from selected Arab countries to register
and be fingerprinted. These actions only encourage others to act as if Arab or
Muslim identity is a permissible basis for suspicion.

Military Tribunals
The final example of the double standard at work is President Bush's
November 2001 order creating military tribunals. As noted at the outset, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to permit any unlawful
combatant to be tried in a military tribunal, irrespective of citizenship. Yet the
president initially opted to limit the tribunals to noncitizens. It seems likely
that this too was a politically opportunistic decision. The government's later
attempt to extend similar detention authority to U.S. citizens Yaser Hamdi and
Jose Padilla generated a groundswell of criticism. Thus far the courts have
rejected the government's assertion of entirely unchecked detention authority
and have required some measure of justification for any such detention of a
citizen. If the tribunal order had applied more broadly to citizens, the citizenry
would have had a much more immediate interest in questioning the president's
assertion of power. The military tribunals provide an extraordinary form of
justice, as they do away with independent judicial review and make the
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determination of guilt solely a matter of military judgment by officials
ultimately answerable in the chain of command to the president as
Commander-in-Chief, on whose behalf the prosecution is brought. Moreover,
the tribunals permit the use of classified evidence, presented ex parte and in
camera, to convict suspects and do not permit access to that evidence by
anyone outside the military chain of command. Such measures may or may not
be justified in wartime, but the important point for current purposes is that it
was politics, not law, that led the administration to restrict the tribunals to
noncitizens.

Citizens' Rights
By contrast, security proposals that would directly affect us all, such
as national identity cards, airport screening measures, and the Justice
Department's Operation TIPS program, have received far more careful
scrutiny than initiatives directed at immigrants. The proposal to create a
national identity card has been on the table since September 12, but has gone
nowhere. And when Operation TIPS came to light, in which the Justice
Department plans to recruit eleven million private citizens to spy on their
neighbors, to be drawn primarily from the ranks of those who have some
reason to gain access to people's homes-such as delivery personnel and meter
readers-it was roundly criticized by voices on all sides of the political
spectrum, from Phyllis Schlafly to the ACLU. And at House Majority Leader
Dick Armey's insistence, the Republicans' Homeland Security Bill expressly
prohibited adoption of either a national identity card or Operation TIPS.
In addition, while federal courts have ruled certain aspects of
Ashcroft's detention campaign illegal, they have principally done so at the
behest of citizens, not immigrants. Several courts have ruled that U.S. citizens
and the press have a First Amendment right to attend deportation hearings.
Only one court has ruled that the aliens themselves have a due process right to
a public trial. And the federal court that ordered disclosure of the detainees'
names did so to vindicate the rights of U.S. citizens' right to know, not aliens'
rights not to be disappeared. The courts have refused even to hear the claims
of the foreign nationals held as enemy combatants at Guantanamo, but have
been more solicitous of claims on behalf of U.S. citizens. When citizens'
rights are directly at stake, in other words, the legal and political processes
have proven much more rights-sensitive. When only immigrants' rights appear
to be at risk, the system hardly blinks.
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III. RESISTING DOUBLE STANDARDS

As a way of striking the difficult balance between liberty and security,
sacrificing foreign citizens' liberties is undoubtedly tempting. It allows those
of us who are citizens to trade someone else's liberties for our security. We
can avoid the difficult trade-offs, and have our security and our liberty, too.
But doing so is wrong as a constitutional and normative matter, unlikely to
make us more secure, and virtually certain to come back to haunt us.

Bill of Rights as Human Rights
As a constitutional matter, basic rights such as due process, equal
protection, and the freedoms of speech and association are not limited to
citizens, but apply to all "persons" within the United States or subject to U.S.
authority. The Constitution does restrict the right to vote to citizens, but that
restriction only underscores by contrast that the Constitution's other rights
apply to all "persons." These are human rights, not privileges of citizenship.
At the time of the framing, they were seen as divinely decreed natural rights;
in today's world, they are the core of what we understand as international
human rights, owed to all persons by virtue of their personhood, irrespective
of their identity or the political character of their government. The Supreme
Court has stated that the First and Fifth Amendments acknowledge no
distinction between citizens and foreigners residing in the United States, and
as recently as 2001 the Court reaffirmed that "the Due Process Clause applies
to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence
here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent." Moreover, the very fact
that noncitizens lack the vote only makes it all the more essential that they
receive judicial protection, as they cannot rely on the political process to
consider their interests.
In addition, as the late renowned Yale law professor Alexander Bickel
argued, past experience with limiting rights on the basis of citizenship should
give us pause. The Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford sought
to deny Dred Scott's rights by concluding that "persons who are descendants
of Africans who were imported into this country, and sold as slaves," were not
citizens and therefore could not invoke federal court jurisdiction. The Court
reasoned that when the Constitution was adopted blacks were not protected by
its provisions because they were "considered as a subordinate and inferior class
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of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights
or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might
choose to grant them."
With the express intent of overruling that reasoning, Congress provided
in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that "all persons born in the United States and
not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States." The same Congress enacted the
Fourteenth Amendment, which provided that all persons born or naturalized
in the United States are citizens and further guaranteed to all persons in the
United States-whether citizens or not-due process of law and equal
protection. As Bickel argued, Dred Scott teaches that "[a] relationship between
government and the governed that turns on citizenship can always be dissolved
or denied [because] [c]itizenship is a legal construct, an abstraction, a theory."
It is far more difficult to deny that a human being is a "person."

Undermining Security
Double standards are also unlikely to make us more secure. Even
granting that it is rational to assume that al Qaeda operatives are more likely
to be Arab or Muslim, if we are going to identify and capture the few al Qaeda
terrorists among the many millions of law-abiding Arabs and Muslims here and
abroad, we need the full cooperation of those communities. The communities
themselves are much better equipped to identify the terrorists residing among
them than are a group of outside law enforcement officials largely unfamiliar
with the language, culture, and community. But when we impose on Arabs
and Muslims burdens that we would not tolerate for ourselves, we make the
targeted communities far less likely to cooperate and simultaneously stoke
anti-American sentiments. And when we single out citizens of Arab countries
for treatment not accorded to other nationals, those countries are likely to be
less eager to assist in the war on terrorism as well.
At the same time, when the government departs from individual
culpability and adopts guilt by association or suspicion by ethnicity as guiding
principles, it encourages sloppy policing and wasteful expenditure of resources
on the innocent. The proxies of ethnicity and political or religious association
are so inexact and overboard that the vast majority of those questioned or
detained are certain to be wholly innocent.
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To cite one example, the federal government has now been attempting
to deport a group of seven Palestinians and a Kenyan in Los Angeles for nearly
sixteen years. (I have been defending the group for the same period of time).
The group came to the FBI's attention in the early 1980s in connection with
counter terrorism investigations relating to the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics.
Most of the eight were college students at the time and were vocally supportive
of Palestinian self-determination.
The FBI spent three years investigating them, including extensive video
and electronic surveillance, renting a home next door to two of the individuals
for six months, and frequent spells of round-the-clock surveillance. One of the
things the students did was to organize annual dinners for the Palestinian
community. The events were widely publicized and open to anyone. As many
as a thousand people attended, including many families and children. The
events featured Palestinian food, music, dancing, and speeches. In addition,
at the close of the evening there was generally a charitable fundraising pitch.
Suspecting that these events may be linked to an alleged terrorist group called
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), FBI agents attended
one of the events and .wrote the following report:
The Federal Agents observing the fund raiser did not speak or
understand the Arabic language, however, from the posters of
Palestinians with AK-47 assaults [sic] rifles and the general
mood or tone of the speeches, the agents realized that the
PFLP was not attempting to raise money for a humanitarian
cause. The music and entire mood of the fund raiser from the
entrance ceremony through the speeches sounded militaristic.
The fact that the FBI would not even bother to have someone attend the
event who could speak Arabic is an illustration of what happens when one
proceeds under a principle of guilt by association. If all one needs to prove is
association, one need not do the difficult work of determining whether in fact
the individuals are engaged in any criminal or terrorist activity. In the end, the
FBI concluded that it had no evidence that any of the individuals had
committed any criminal or terrorist activity, but nonetheless urged the INS to
deport them for their political associations.
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The Illusory Double Standard
As it happens, you can't really have your cake and eat it, too. The
argument that we are only targeting aliens' rights, and therefore citizens need
not worry, is in an important sense illusory, for what we do to aliens today
provides a precedent for what can and will be done to citizens tomorrow.
When the president introduced the concept of military justice with his military
tribunal order in November, for example, he reassured Americans that it would
not apply to them but only to noncitizens. Yet now the administration has
crossed that line and asserted the same authority with respect to the two U.S.
citizens, Hamdi and Padilla, that it asserts with respect to the foreign citizens
held at Guantanamo. The military claims that simply by attaching the label
"enemy combatant," the president can authorize the indefinite, incommunicado
incarceration of any U.S. citizen he chooses, without access to counsel and
without judicial review. Military justice has come home to roost. This
proposition is so extreme that even the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, by far the most conservative federal circuit in the country, has rejected
it.
Yet the Wall Street Journal reported in August that high-level
administration officials have advocated even broader reliance on this power and
have suggested creating a special camp to house more citizen "enemy
combatants."
The line between alien and citizen has often been crossed before. In
fact, two of the most shameful episodes of our nation's history also had their
provenance in measures initially targeted at noncitizens. The McCarthy era of
the 1940s and 1950s, in which thousands of Americans were tarred with guilt
by association, ,vas simply an extension to citizens of a similar campaign using
similar techniques against alien radicals in the first Red Scare thirty years
earlier. The earlier Red Scare, which culminated in the arrests of thousands
of aliens for their political associations during the Palmer Raids, was
coordinated by a young J. Edgar Hoover, then in the Alien Radical division of
the Justice Department. Hoover applied what he had learned in the first Red
Scare to U.S. citizens during the second Red Scare, which targeted thousands
of them.
The same pattern underlies the internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese
descent during World War II. Since 1798, the Enemy Aliens Act has
authorized the president during wartime to arrest, detain, deport, or otherwise
restrict the freedom of anyone over fourteen years old who is a citizen of the
country with which we are at war, without regard to any actual evidence of
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disloyalty, sabotage, or danger. The justification for that law, which the
Supreme Court has upheld as constitutional, is that during wartime one can
presume that citizens of the enemy country are loyal to their own country, not
ours, and that there is insufficient time to identify those who are actually
disloyal.
In World War II we simply extended that argument to U.S. citizens
through the prism of race. The Army argued that persons of Japanese descent,
even if they were technically American citizens because they were born here,
remained for all practical purposes "enemy aliens," presumptively likely to be
loyal to Japan. Lt. General John L. DeWitt, the driving force behind the
internment orders, wrote in his report on the Japanese evacuation that "[tihe
Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation
Japanese, born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship,
have become Americanized, the racial strains are undiluted." More
colloquially, General DeWitt testified in 1943 before the House Naval Affairs
Committee, that "[a] Jap's a Jap ... It makes no difference whether he is an
American citizen or not." And so we locked up 110,000 persons solely because
of their Japanese ancestry, 70,000 of them U.S. citizens.
The pattern is also evident in more recent history, much of which I
have experienced first-hand as a constitutional lawyer for the Center for
Constitutional Rights. When the eight Los Angeles-based Palestinian activists
referred to above were arrested in January 1987, FBI Director William
Webster testified in Congress that a three-year FBI investigation had found no
evidence of criminal or terrorist activity, but that the individuals "were arrested
because they are alleged to be members of a world-wide Communist
organization which, under the McCarran Act, makes them eligible for
deportation," and that "if these individuals had been United States citizens,
there would not have been a basis for their arrest." The INS district director
explained that the INS sought their deportation "at the behest of the FBI, which
concluded after investigating [the eight] that it had no basis for prosecuting
[them] criminally."
Contemporaneous FBI memoranda prepared to urge the INS to deport
the eight aliens confirm that they were targeted solely for lawful political
associations and advocacy that would be fully protected if engaged in by U.S.
citizens. The memoranda consist entirely of accounts of lawful political
activity. The memos repeatedly criticize the aliens' political views as "anti-US,
anti-Israel, anti-Jordan," and even "anti-REAGAN and anti-MABARAK [sic]."
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Over three hundred pages are devoted to tracking compulsively the distribution
of PFLP newspapers, available in public libraries throughout the United States,
as if they were illegal drugs. Agents intercepted boxes of magazines imported
from abroad at the Los Angeles airport, weighed them to estimate how many
magazines they contained, and then carefully tracked those who picked up and
distributed the magazines.
The principal FBI report on the group admitted that the FBI's purpose
was "to identify key PFLP people in Southern California so that law
enforcement agencies capable of disrupting the PFLP's activities through legal
action can do so," even though the FBI had found no evidence of illegal
activities. The FBI specifically urged deportation of the alleged "leader" of the
group, Khader Hamide, not because he engaged in any criminal acts, but
because he was "intelligent, aggressive, dedicated, and shows great leadership
ability."
Even though Congress in 1990 repealed the immigration law provisions
that made aliens deportable for associating with groups advocating
communism, the INS continued its deportation efforts, pursuing some of the
eight on routine visa violation charges and charging the two who were
permanent residents with having "engaged in terrorist activity" by providing
material support to the PFLP. The aliens obtained an injunction against the
deportation proceedings, successfully arguing that they had been singled out
for deportation based on First Amendment-protected activities. In opposing the
injunction, the government argued that aliens enjoyed only diminished First
Amendment rights and that therefore the INS should be permitted to single out
aliens for deportation based on their association with and support of a terrorist
group without having to show that the conduct in any way furthered any
terrorist activity.
The federal courts rejected this argument, holding that aliens in the
United States are entitled to the same First Amendment rights as citizens. In
1996, however, the INS persuaded Congress to repeal federal court jurisdiction
to hear cases challenging selective enforcement of the immigration law, and the
Supreme Court ruled that the aliens' challenge to their deportation should be
dismissed, with a gratuitous aside suggesting that selectively targeting aliens for
deportation for their associations is constitutionally acceptable. To this day,
nearly sixteen years after the initial arrests, the government continues to seek
the aliens' deportation, notwithstanding its initial admission that they have
engaged in no illegal or terrorist activity. From the government's perspective,
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that admission is not material because any support to a "terrorist group," even
to its wholly lawful activities, should be a legally sufficient basis for
deportation.
In the Los Angeles deportation case the government consistently argued
that aliens were entitled to reduced First Amendment protection. But as in the
World War II and McCarthy era periods, its arguments were soon extended to
citizens. In the 1996 Anti-TerrorismandEffective Death Penalty Act, Congress
made it a crime, punishable by ten years in prison and a substantial fine, to
provide any material support to a designated terrorist organization. Prior law
had criminalized material support of terrorist activity, which required the
government to show some connection between an individual's support and the
terrorist activity. Just as the PatriotAct later did with respect to immigration
law, the 1996 statute dispensed with the requirement that the government prove
a nexus to terrorist activity for criminal prosecutions. Under this law, like the
PatriotAct, a person who supports a designated organization is liable even if
he can show that his support was designed to discourage the group from
engaging in violence and actually had that effect. Here again, then, a theory
initially used against aliens and defended on the ground that aliens deserve less
constitutional protection than citizens proved to be a precursor for a similar law
directed at citizens.
One practice that one might think citizens need not worry about is the
use of secret evidence to determine the outcome of legal proceedings
concerning their liberty or property. The Confrontation Clause guarantees that
anyone tried in a criminal court has a right to confront the evidence used
against him, and the elemental due process requirement that persons be
afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard would seem to require access
to the dispositive evidence used to take one's liberty or property. Yet the
government has for fifty years used secret evidence submitted in camera and
ex parte in immigration proceedings and has argued that aliens are not
constitutionally entitled to confront the evidence against them even when their
physical liberty is at stake. Here, too, the government has maintained that
aliens enjoy only diminished constitutional protections. But here, too, the
government has sought to extend this practice to United States citizens.
Consider the case of Hany Kiareldeen, a Palestinian in his thirties who
came to the United States on a student visa in 1990 and now lives in Newark,
New Jersey. In March 1998, the INS arrested Kiareldeen, charged him with
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failing to maintain his student visa status, and detained him without bond,
claiming that he was a threat to national security.
Kiareldeen never saw the evidence that allegedly supported his
detention as a security threat because the INS submitted it to an immigration
judge in camera and ex parte. The INS did give Kiareldeen an unclassified
summary of the evidence, but the summary initially disclosed only that he was
allegedly associated with terrorists and posed a threat to the attorney general,
charges so general that Kiareldeen could not possibly rebut them.
Subsequently, the INS expanded its disclosure and ultimately revealed
three allegations: 1) that Kiareldeen was associated with an unidentified
"terrorist organization" and with other members and suspected members of
terrorist organizations, also unidentified; 2) that about a week before the first
World Trade Center bombing, Kiareldeen hosted a meeting at his residence in
Nutley, New Jersey, where some individuals discussed plans to bomb the
World Trade Center; and 3) that "Kiareldeen expressed a desire to murder
Attorney General Janet Reno." The summary provided no further details. It
did not, for example, identify the sources for any of these allegations, nor did
it explain the context or time frame for the alleged relationships and statement.
Kiareldeen was nonetheless able to rebut the government's case in open
court. He proved, for example, that he did not even live in the apartment
where he supposedly hosted a meeting with World Trade Center bombers until
a year and a half after the alleged meeting took place. He showed that his
phone records from the time revealed no phone calls to other conspirators in
the World Trade Center case, while the conspirators' phone records showed
extensive calls among themselves. And he testified that one of the sources of
secret evidence against him, his ex-wife, had made numerous false allegations
against him in the course of a custody battle over their child. Kiareldeen
sought to examine his ex-wife in open court, but the INS vigorously opposed
his attempts to do so, and she refused to testify about her discussions with the
FBI.
In the end, all seven immigration judges who examined the complete
record in Kiareldeen's case, including the government's secret evidence
presentation and Kiareldeen's open court rebuttal, rejected the government's
contention that he posed a threat to national security, and he was eventually
released-but not before he spent nineteen months in jail on the basis of that
secret evidence.
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Kiareldeen is not alone. Since 1987 1 have represented thirteen aliens
against whom the government has sought to use secret evidence either to detain
or to deport them. In each case the government claimed that the evidence
showed the aliens to be threats to national security. Yet in each case the aliens
were eventually released by court order, either because federal courts
concluded that reliance on classified evidence was unconstitutional, or because
once the government disclosed some of the classified evidence, the alien was
able to rebut the charges in immigration court. In each case in which the
charges were disclosed, they consisted of little more than guilt by association.
(One of the thirteen, Mazen AI-Najjar, a Palestinian adjunct professor at
University of South Florida, was subsequently rearrested and deported after
September 11. The government argued that it could detain Al-Najar without
any evidence that he posed a danger or flight risk. Al-Najjar challenged that
position in court, but was deported before the legal challenge to his custody
concluded).
In the wake of September 11 the use of secret evidence has now been
extended to domestic law affecting citizens. The Treasury Department, relying
on the PatriotAct, has seized all property and blocked all bank accounts of
three U.S.-based charities: Holy Land Foundation, Global Relief Foundation,
Inc., and Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. In each case it did so
without notice or an opportunity for a hearing. When the charities, all
American corporations with U.S. -citizen board members, sued to challenge the
legality of the seizures, the government argued that the organizations had no
right to present evidence in their own defense. In addition, the government
invoked a provision of the PatriotAct that authorizes it to present classified
evidence in camera and ex parte to defend the seizures.
Nor is this the first time that the use of secret evidence has been
extended from immigrants to citizens. In the Cold War the government
extended the practice to citizens as well, as both the House Un-American
Activities Committee and federal employment loyalty review boards required
suspects to answer charges made in secret by anonymous informants and
denied those accused any opportunity to confront their accusers.
History reveals that the distinction between citizen and alien has often
been resorted to as a justification for liberty-infringing measures in times of
crisis. In the short term, the fact that measures are limited to noncitizens
appears to make them easier for the majority to accept-citizens are not asked
to sacrifice their own liberty. But the same history suggests that citizens should
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be wary about relying on this distinction because it has often been breached
before. What we are willing to do to noncitizens ultimately affects what we are
willing to .do to citizens. In the long run, all of our rights are at stake in the
war against terrorism.

IV. CONCLUSION

Security is indisputably at a premium in the wake of the attacks of
September 11. There may well be justification for sacrificing some of our
liberties if the sacrifice will make us more secure. But many of the measures
we have undertaken after September 11 follow a disturbing historical pattern,
in which we, the citizenry, sacrifice not our freedoms but the freedoms of
noncitizens, a minority group with no vote, in the interest of preserving
citizens' security. The post-September 11 response constitutes a reprise of
some of the worst mistakes of our past. Once again, we are treating people as
suspicious not for their conduct, but based on their racial, ethnic, or political
identity. Once again, we are using the immigration power as a pretext for
criminal law enforcement without the protections associated with the criminal
process. Once again, we have undertaken a mass detention campaign directed
at immigrants without probable cause that any of them are tied to the specific
threats that we face. And once again, we have authorized the government to
bypass procedures designed to distinguish the guilty from the innocent, holding
secret hearings and authorizing executive detentions that challenge the most
basic notions of fairness.
As politically tempting as the trade-off of immigrants' liberties for our
security may appear, we should resist it for reasons of principle, pragmatism,
and self-interest. As a matter of principle, the rights that we have selectively
denied to immigrants should not be reserved for citizens. The rights of
political freedom, due process, and equal protection belong to every person
subject to U.S. legal obligations, irrespective of citizenship. As a pragmatic
matter, reliance on double standards reduces the legitimacy of our struggle,
and that legitimacy may be our most valuable asset, both at home and abroad.
To paraphrase John Ashcroft himself: "To those who pit Americans against
immigrants and citizens against non-citizens . . . my message is this: Your
tactics only aid terrorism." And as a matter of self-interest, what we do to
aliens today may well pave the way for what will be done to citizens tomorrow.
In the end, however, it is principle that should drive us: the justice of our
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response should be judged by how we treat those who have no voice in the
political process. Thus far, we have performed predictably, but not well.

